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RAOUL BERGER*
At the outset (1977) activists dismissed my Government by Judiciary' out
of hand.2 Now, five years later, Paul Dimond informs us that his Meeting
Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds was financed by the Ford Founda-
tion, the Carnegie Foundation, and Michigan and American University Law
Schools,3 suggesting that my views have become a burr under the activist
saddle.4
In the main Dimond rehashes the stale generalities 5 of prior activist crit-
ics without taking account of my painstaking, point by point refutation of those
worthies.6 Those who do not study a writer's replies to his critics, to borrow
from Santayana, are doomed to repeat their mistakes. An activist more candid
than most, Michael Perry, recently listed examples of the "commentary gen-
erally accepting Berger's history" and some "generally effective rebuttals by
Berger to criticisms of his history." 7 Like the prior critics, Dimond prefers
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1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977).
2. Brest, Berger v. Brown et al., N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 10; Cover, NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, (Book Review), at 26. Henry Monaghan wrote, "Berger's uncomfortable and un-
fashionable analysis is an important one. It will not do, as some have already done, to brush it aside in
peremptory manner." Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 124
(1978).
3. Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection
Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Intepretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982).
4. Commenting on the ongoing attacks on Stanley Elkins' Slavery (1959), Eric Foner wrote: "In the
writing of history, refutation, not imitation, is often the sincerest form of flattery. Mr. Elkins' thesis, for
example, remains important precisely because a generation of scholars has directed its energies to overturning
it." Foner, The Slaveholder as Factory Owner, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1982, § 11 (Book Review), at 11, 27.
5. Referring to the "now-familiar litany of activists," such as claims that constitutional "phrases are
'vague' and 'malleable' and must be 'creatively discerned afresh,"' John Burleigh observed, "Such rhetoric is,
of course, sand in the eyes .... .- Burleigh, The Supreme Court vs. The Constitution, THE PUBLIC INTEREST
151, 152 (Winter Supp. 1978).
6. Dimond, supra note 3, at 463 n.7, cites Curtis, Kutler, Soifer, and Murphy. For my replies, not cited by
Dimond, see Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981) (to Curtis); Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review (pt. 5; "Comment on Stanley I.
Kutler's Essay") 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 590 (1979); Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L.
REV. 427 (1981); Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 341.
7. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n. 100
(1981). Another candid activist, Larry Alexander, wrote,
Berger has forced all serious constitutional theorists to deal with questions regarding proper principles
of constitutional interpretation and the proper role of the courts, questions that many theorists, basking
in the warm glow of Warren Court decisions on individual rights, felt content to ignore. Berger has
quite convincingly demonstrated that the bulk of modem judicial decisions under the fourteenth
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generalities to telling specifics. Thus he refers to Alexander Bickel's state-
ment that "the legislative record concerning the broad constitutional phrases
cannot produce 'specific answers to specific present problems .... the an-
swer that must emerge in the vast majority of cases is no answer.' , 8 Yet in at
least two specific and crucial instances the answer is unmistakable. That
suffrage was excluded from the fourteenth amendment, said Justice Harlan, is
"irrefutable," 9 and more and more activists, including Dimond, are agreed. '0
So too, activists increasingly acknowledge that what Dimond describes as
"one intractable aspect of racial discrimination-segregation in the
schools"" likewise was excluded. 12 On my two central issues, therefore,
"the scholarly controversy over the 'original understanding"" 3 largely has
been resolved, a fact that a subsidized refutation was duty bound to notice
and rebut, but did not "meet."
I. DiMOND'S RECITALS ARE UNTRUSTWORTHY
One who undertakes to tear down the scholarship of another is under a
duty of unimpeachable accuracy. Dimond adds to frequent inaccuracy per-
sistent misrepresentations of my position, indicating that he either does not
understand what he reads or is so ridden by his ideological prepossessions as
to be oblivious to discrepant facts. In either case his credibility is seriously
damaged. A scholar is required to take account of discrepant facts. 14
(1) "Berger views Bingham as a Negrophobe" 5 who "favored most
racial discrimination," 16 notwithstanding I noted that John Bingham "had
been a leading congressional antislavery constitutional theorist," 17 a role that
amendment cannot be justified by reference to what the drafters of that amendment believed the
amendment would accomplish. Moreover, Berger has argued with great force that judicial decisions
that cannot be justified by what the constitutional Framers specifically intended are illegitimate in a
democracy.
Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3,
4 (1981).
8. Dimond, supra note 3, at 464.
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965).
10. Dimond, supra note 3, at 472 n.46; Abraham, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 467-68
(1979); Alfange, Book Review, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 403,406 (1970); Mendelson, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437,453 (1979); Nathanson,
Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1978). Gerald Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers
agree" that "the one person-one vote" doctrine "lacks all historical justification." Gunther, Too Much a Battle
With Straw Men?, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1977, at 4, col. 5.
11. Dimond, supra note 3, at 465.
12. Nathanson wrote about the argument that the fourteenth amendment "would not require school deseg-
regation or negro suffrage. These are not surprising historical conclusions. The first was quite conclusively
demonstrated by Alexander Bickel ... the second was also quite convincingly demonstrated by Mr. Justice
Harlan.... Berger's independent research and analysis confirms and adds weight to those conclusions."
Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978). See also Abraham, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 467, 467-68 (1979); Afange, Book Review, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Perry,
Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 292 (1981).
13. Dimond, supra note 3, at 463.
14. "Historical reconstruction," wrote the eminent historiographer, Sir Herbert Butterfield, "must at least
account for the evidence that is discrepant." H. BUTTERFIELD, GEORGE iii AND THE HISTORIANS 225
(1959).
15. Dimond, supra note 3, at 481.
16. Id. at 489. See also id. at 490 n. 145 and accompanying text.
17. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 207 n.49.
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is utterly incompatible with negrophobia. In the passage Dimond cited' 8 I
merely pointed out that Bingham opposed the inclusion in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 of the phrase "there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or
immunities" on the ground that it would "embrace every" right including
"political rights," and therefore must be "stricken out or the constitutions of
the States are to be abolished by your act."' 9 This I characterized as "a
States' Rights manifesto, ' 20 unaccompanied by the remotest reference to
racism. To convert this to a charge of "negrophobia" is grotesquely to mis-
represent my views.
(2) Dimond attributes to me the view that "the requirements of equal
protection are satisfied by separate but equal facilities, ' 2' and asserts that
"Berger's materials on the separate but equal question imply that Plessy
was ... correctly decided. . .. "22 My sole reference to Plessy v. Ferguson
23
was to Justice Frankfurter's listing of Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Clark,
Reed, and Jackson as "'probable dissenters if the Court voted to overturn
Plessy in the Spring of 1953.' ,24 Indeed, Dimond observes that "Berger's
book ... never addresses the propriety of the Supreme Court's 1896 decision
in Plessy v. Ferguson";25 apart from identifying it in a footnote to the
Frankfurter list as the "separate but equal decision," it was never mentioned
again.
(3) Dimond has it that Berger "argues against any 'judicial enforcement of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment,"' citing to my comments on section 5:
"Congress shall have power to enforce" the provisions of the amendment.
26
Very early the Court declared that section 5 conferred power on Congress,
not the Court;27 and the framers contemplated that judicial enforcement
would require a delegation from Congress. At the cited point I stated, "A
reasoned argument for a judicial power of enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment-apart from that derived from the grant in the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which Congress is free to withdraw-has yet to be made." 28 This is not
an argument "against any judicial enforcement" but a statement that it de-
pends upon a delegation by Congress. 29
(4) "Berger reads the privileges or immunities clause of the second sen-
18. Id. at 120.
19. Id.
20. Id. "In calling for the deletion, Bingham, the former abolition theorist, had openly acknowledged that
the bill as drafted would have prohibited statutes such as school segregation." R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
640-41 (1976). Justice Black considered that Bingham objected to the Civil Rights Bill because it "would actually
strip the states of power to govern." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 100 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
21. Dimond, supra note 3, at 507.
22. Id. at 507-08.
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 128 (quoting R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 612, 614 (1976)).
25. Dimond, supra note 3, at 507.
26. Id. at 471 n.44.
27. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
28. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 229. For citations see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From
the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 350-52 (1979).
29. It is orthodox learning that federal jurisdiction depends upon a grant from Congress. Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1881); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 236, 245 (1845); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
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tence to limit the meaning of citizenship provided in the first." 30 Now, the
three clauses of the second sentence had been framed long before it was
discovered that a conflict over whether or not Negroes were "citizens" re-
mained to be resolved. For though the thirteenth amendment had emancipat-
ed the Negro, the Dred Scott decision 31 threw a cloud over his citizenship.
The sole purpose of the first sentence, as said by Senator Lyman Trumbull,
was "to end that very controversy, whether the negro is a citizen or not, ' 32 a
view likewise expressed by Senator Jacob Howard.33 In Dimond's own
words, the Senate "added a provision to section 1 to clarify what 'persons'
are citizens and to bury the contrary conclusion of Dred Scott forever."34
There was not the slightest intimation that it was also intended to alter the
content of the three clauses of the second sentence. In an 1866 decision
Circuit Justice Swayne declared, "The fact that one is a subject or citizen
determines nothing as to his rights as such .... Citizenship has no necessary
connection with the franchise of voting.., or indeed any other rights, civil
or political." 35 It follows that the addition of citizenship in the first sentence
did not enlarge the rights conferred by the second.
(5) Dimond attributes to Senator Luke Poland of Vermont the view that
"the proposed privileges or immunities clause merely incorporated the words
from section 2 of article IV with all their ambiguity." 36 Poland did not remote-
ly suggest that the words were ambiguous. As former chief justice of his state,
he was presumably aware that, among others, Trumbull in the Senate and
William Lavrence of Ohio in the House had alluded to judicial constructions
of the terms,37 which a judge would know removed "their ambiguity." Next,
there is Poland's remark about the equal protection clause: "Congress has
already shown its desire and intention to uproot and destroy all such partial
State legislation in the passage of what is called the civil rights bill."-
38
Dimond comments, "Poland either thought that the 1866 Civil Rights Act
applied to all racially partial legislation, or recognized that the equal protec-
tion clause did not merely prohibit the Black Codes.", 39 Dimond overlooked
one crucial word--such." It was not "all racially partial State legislation" to
which Poland adverted, but "all such partial State legislation" as was banned
in "the civil rights bill." That bill, as will appear, was limited in terms and that
limitation was repeatedly emphasized in the debates, points of which a chief
justice would not be unaware.
30. Dimond, supra note 3, at 469 (emphasis in original).
31. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
32. CO0NG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1285 (1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE].
33. Id. at 2890, 2896. For additional citations see R. BERGER, supra note I, at 44-45.
34. Dimond, supra note 3, at 499.
35. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785,790 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). The Civil Rights Bill first
conferred citizenship and then went on to grant certain privileges. See GLOBE, supra note 32, at 474. Senator
Trumbull stated, "[A] man may be a citizen in this country without a right to vote" or other rights. Id. at 1757.
36. Dimond, supra note 3, at 500 (emphasis added).
37. See infra text accompanying note 181.
38. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2%1 (emphasis added).
39. Dimond, supra note 3, at 500 (emphasis in original).
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Such inaccuracies and misrepresentations-there are others40-suggest
either that Dimond framed the indictment before he studied the record or that
he is a careless reader whose judgment is not to be trusted. Although it is
frustrating once more to retraverse the ground covered by my replies to the
activist critics Dimond cites, the subsidy of Dimond's study by several foun-
dations and law schools constrains me to undertake the ungrateful task.
Let me begin with his misconceptions, which start with his title, Strict
Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination .... apparently
categorizing me as a "strict constructionist.", 4' But my thesis is that the Court
has flouted the unmistakable intention of the fourteenth's framers, displacing
their choices by its own.42 That is not "strict construction." Dimond blandly
views this as the Court's "institutional mission... its role in articulating the
contemporary meaning of sweeping phrases like equal protection," 4 3 as if the
exclusion of suffrage and desegration could mean one thing in 1866 and has
come to mean the exact opposite today. 44 Invocation of that view indicates
that Dimond cannot really rely on history for the claimed power.
His headlong commitment to activist theology blinds him to threshold
obstacles. So he states, given the "common understanding of the vagueness
of much of the constitutional text, Berger bears the burden of proving that the
equal protection clause was intended to enumerate [?] specific, narrow pro-
tections against racial discrimination."' 45 Rights reserved to the states by the
tenth amendment cannot be curtailed under cover of "vague" terms,46 partic-
ularly because the framers were acutely conscious that every antidiscrimina-
tion proposal involved a corresponding diminution of states' rights. 47 An in-
40. See also infra text accompanying note 133; and text accompanying notes 192-96. Others will appear in
the course of the following pages.
41. Dimond, supra note 3, at 462.
42. Judge J. Skelly Wright, an apologist for activism, wrote, "[The most important value choices have
already been made by the framers .... .- Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 784 (1971). Judicial "value choices are to be made only within the parameters of
the most important value choice embedded in the constitutional language." Id. at 785.
43. Dimond, supra note 3, at 463 (emphasis added).
44. Chief Justice Taney declared, "If in this court we are at liberty to give old words new meanings...
there is no power which may not, by this mode of construction, be conferred on the general government and
denied to the States." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,478 (1849). In this he echoed Madison: "[If] the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified ... be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no
security ... for a faithful exercise of its powers." 9 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910).
In 1872 a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report, signed by Senators who had voted for the
fourteenth amendment, stated, "A construction which should give the phrase... a meaning differing from the
sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as
unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express language of the Constitution .... S. REP. NO. 21,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS* DEBATES
571-72 (1967).
45. Dimond, supra note 3, at 464 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
46. The great object of the Bill of Rights, said Madison, "is to limit and qualify the powers of Government,
by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a
particular mode." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 437 (Gale & Seaton ed. 1836) (print bearing running title "History
of Congress").
47. Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, said, 'it]he proposition to
prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any class of persons, encounters a great objection on the
threshold. It trenches upon the principle of existing local sovereignty.... It takes away a right which has been
always supposed to inhere in the States .... ." GLOBE, supra note 32, at 358; see also statements of Columbus
Delano, id. at App. 158; and statements of Charles A. Eldridge, id. at 1154. Dimond, however, rejoices in the
"open-endedness and generality" of § I, Dimond, supra note 3, at 472, which "leaves open the nature and reach
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tention to curtail them, Chief Justice Marshall declared in 1833 and Justice
Miller reiterated in 1872, requires clear, not vague, statements." Activists
therefore carry the burden of proving an intention by "vague" words to
diminish the province of the states. Then, too, a "vague" term may be ilu-
minated by the "original understanding," and if that is clear, it overrides the
text.49 That centuries-old canon is not noticed by Dimond, although it was
reaffirmed by a Reconstruction Congress.5°
II. SUFFRAGE AND SEGREGATION
The vast bulk of my historical discussion was devoted to suffrage, which
a considerable body of activists agrees was excluded from the fourteenth
amendment. Dimond himself concedes that that exclusion "does have sup-
port in the text and structure of the fourteenth amendment"; but he cannot
bring himself to admit that the reapportionment decision therefore represents
a reversal of the framers' exclusion, saying that that case "is beyond the
scope of this Article." 5' In Sumner's eyes suffrage was the quintessential
right: "if the [fourteenth] is inadequate to protect [them] in their ... right to
vote, it is inadequate to protect them in anything .... Hence, Richard
Kluger, an admirer of Brown v. Board of Education,53 asked, "Could it be
reasonably claimed that segregation had been outlawed by the Fourteenth
when the yet more basic emblem of citizenship-the ballot-had been with-
held from the Negro under the amendment?" 54 Dimond, however, summons
"the way that the Reconstruction Congress dealt with one intractable aspect
of racial discrimination-segregation in the schools" 55 as disclosing the four-
teenth amendment's "actual role as a general protection against official caste
of the states' antidiscrimination duties." Id. at 471. He considers that the framers did not fail "to express their
intent in plain English." Id. at 468. It may be "plain English" but nonetheless, by his own testimony, "vague."
On the other hand, J. H. Ely, another activist, finds that "open-ended generality" "frightening," "scary." See
infra note 260 and accompanying text.
48. Chief Justice Marshall held that a purpose to invade the province of the states by the Bill of Rights
"would have [been] declared... in plain and intelligible language." Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250 (1833). Justice Miller rejected a broad interpretation of the "privileges or immunities" clause that would
subject the states to "the control of Congress... in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose
too clearly to admit of doubt." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78, (1872). See also id. at 82;
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
49. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903).
50. See supra note 44.
51. Dimond, supra note 3, at 472 n.46. Robert Bork stated, "The principle of one man, one
vote.., runs counter to the text of the fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and
ratification and the political practice of Americans from colonial times up to the day the Court invented the new
formula." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1971). So too,
Gerald Gunther wrote,
The ultimate justification for the Reynolds ruling is hard, if not impossible, to set forth in constitutional-
ly legitimate terms. It rests, rather, on the view that courts are authorized to step in when injustices
exist and other institutions fail to act. That is a dangerous-and I think illegitimate-prescription for
judicial action.
Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817,
825.
52. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869).
53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 635 (1976).
55. Dimond, supra note 3, at 465.
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discrimination. ' 56 In short, "[t]he evidence suggests that Brown's result was
within the scope that the framers envisioned for the fourteenth amend-
ment." 57 This is an astonishing misreading of the history which records that
one Reconstruction Congress after another rejected proposals to ban mixed
schools.
58
The temper of the times is disclosed by remarks Senator James Harlan of
Iowa made when desegregation of the District of Columbia schools was under
discussion in April 1860:
I know that there is an objection to the association of colored children with white
children in the same schools. This prejudice exists in my own State. It would be
impossible to carry a proposition in Iowa to educate the few colored children that
now live in that State in the same school houses with white children. It would be
impossible, I think, in any one of the States in the Northwest.
5 9
Howard Jay Graham, a foe of discrimination, wrote that "Negroes were bar-
red from public schools in the North. . . ,"60 a fact likewise noted by
Dimond. 6' Dimond observes that "many free states, of course, also imposed
caste distinctions to exclude blacks altogether or to keep blacks in a second-
class condition." 62 The unceasing efforts of Senator Charles Sumner to abol-
ish segregated schools in the District of Columbia were unavailing63-the
very galleries of both Houses were segregated. 64 Consequently, a veteran
judge, E. Barrett Prettyman, held that congressional support for segregated
schools in the District of Columbia contemporaneous with the adoption of the
amendment (and the Civil Rights Act of 1866) was conclusive evidence that
Congress had not intended section 1 of the amendment to invalidate school
segregation laws. 65 It is unrealistic to presume that a Congress that had ple-
nary jurisdication over the District and yet refused to bar segregation there
56. Id. at 464.
57. Id. at 465. For general activist concurrence that segregation was excluded, see supra note 12. H. S.
Commager advised the NAACP that "[t]he framers of the amendment did not, so far as we know, intend that it
should be used to end segregation in schools." R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 620 (1976). M.L. Benedict
labelled Brown v. Board of Education "the greatest intrusion into policymaking since its [the Courts's] obstruc-
tion of New Deal legislation in the early 1930s." Benedict, To Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy, and
Judicial Review in the Anglo-American Constitutional Heritage, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 69 (1981). "Certainly
Berger convincingly argues that the fourteenth amendment was crystal clear with regard to suffrage and segrega-
tion .... Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 913. Philip Kurland wrote that "in Brown the Court
abandoned the search for the framers' intent ... and chose instead to write a Constitution for our times."
Kurland, Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 315.
58. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 326-31 (1979).
Dimond notes "The lack of popular support for mixed schools generally frustrated Sumner's eight-year cam-
paign in Congress to legislate specifically against separate schools." Dimond, supra note 3, at 503. He naively
ascribes this to "'political expediency," Id. at 504; "passage was politically impossible," id. at 503, as if the
framing of an amendment were not responsive to "political expediency."
59. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680 (1860).
60. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 290 n.70 (1968).
61. Dimond, supra note 3, at 503.
62. Id. at 473 n.54.
63. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049,
1085 (1956).
64. Dimond, supra note 3, at 503.
65. Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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would turn around to invade state sovereignty, which the framers were zeal-
ous to preserve, 66 in order to impose desegregation upon the states.
When Brown was first argued before the Supreme Court, Alexander
Bickel, whom Dimond is fond of citing-and misciting-to me, was law clerk
to Justice Frankfurter, who assigned to him compilation of the legislative
history of the amendment. Upon delivery of his memorandum he stated in a
covering letter, "It was preposterous to worry about unsegregated schools,
for example, when hardly a beginning had been made at educating Negroes at
all and when obviously special efforts, suitable only for the Negroes, would
have to be made." 67
To have upended segregated schools, Charles Fairman observed, "would
have exposed the bill to active opposition in the North."8 Cognizant of such
sentiments, James Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee and manager of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, assured the House that the
words "civil rights" do not "mean that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or
that their children shall attend the same schools." 69 A prelude of the 39th
Congress' program was the Carl Schurz report, Education of the Freedmen;
throughout, it spoke of "'colored schools,' 'school houses in which colored
children were taught.' . . . There were no references to unsegregated schools,
even as an ultimate objective ... , Instead there was a pervasive assump-
tion that segregation would remain. Referring to the burning of black schools
in Maryland, Josiah B. Grinnell of Iowa said, give them schoolhouses and
"invite schoolmasters from all over the world to come and instruct them.", 7'
Senator Daniel Clark of New Hampshire stated, "[Y]ou may establish for him
66. For the framers' attachment to state sovereignty, see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 60-464; and supra
note 47.
67. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976).
68. 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1179 (1971).
69. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1117. See also id. at 1294. Compare Wilson's assurance with Dimond's
reference to "the proponents' similarly silent reaction to Rogers' [an extremist Democratic opponent] charge
that H.R. 63 authorized Congress to prohibit racially dual schooling." Dimond, supra note 3, at 497 n.189.
Having made their point by a leading spokesman, the framers were not obliged to rise to every exaggerated
charge by an opponent seeking to scuttle the bill. See Trumbull's statement, infra note 238.
A campaign for political and social equality, Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin confessed, was "fright-
ening" to the Republicans who "represented states containing large numbers of the despised and feared free
Negroes." D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 158 (1970). Derrick Bell, a black
academician, points out that "few abolitionists were interested in offering blacks the equality they touted so
highly. Indeed, the anguish most abolitionists experienced as to whether slaves should be granted social
equality.., is well documented." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 167. See also infra text accompany-
ing note 238.
William Windom of Minnesota said the Bill does not confer "social privileges. It merely provides safe-
guards to shield [blacks] from wrong and outrage and to protect them in the enjoyment of... the right to
exist." GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1159. See also statements of James W. Patterson and Senator Lyman
Trumbull, quoted in R. BERGER, supra note I, at 29; statements of William Lawrence of Ohio, GLOBE, supra
note 32, at 1836. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), Justice Bradley declared, "Congress did not
assume" by the Civil Rights Bill to "adjust what may be called the social rights of men ... but only to declare
and vindicate those fundamental rights," i.e., "the same right to make and enforce contracts" and so forth. id.
at 22.
70. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 n.29
(1955).
71. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 125.
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schools." 72 Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota said, "Educate him and he will
himself see to it that the common schools shall forever continue among his
people." 73 Senator William P. Fessenden said of the "representation" propo-
sal that was to become section 2 of the fourteenth amendment: It "should
serve as an inducement to the southern States to build school houses.., and
educate their colored children until they are fit to vote." 74 In vetoing the
antecedent Freedmen's Bureau Bill, President Andrew Johnson noted that it
provided for the "erection for their benefit of suitable buildings for asylums
and schools," and objected that Congress "has never founded schools for any
class of our own people." 75 The leading radical, Thaddeus Stevens, "did not
publicly object to the separation of the races in the schools although he was
against segregation in theory .... But he never pressed for legal enforcement
of this kind of equality, as Charles Sumner did, believing it achievement
enough that the South would have free schools at all.",
7 6
Apart from opponents' remarks designed to defeat the framers' propos-
als, no one asserted that either the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the fourteenth
amendment outlawed school segregation, the absence of which keyed into
Northern aversion to mixed schools. "[R]acism," remarks David Donald,
Sumner's biographer, "ran deep in the North," 77 and the suggestion that
"Negroes should be treated as equal to white men woke some of the deepest
and ugliest fears in the American mind." 78 In 1869 Senator Henry Wilson, the
Massachusetts radical, stated, "There is not to-day a square mile in the
United States where the advocacy of the equal rights and privileges of those
colored men has not been in the past and is not now unpopular. ' 79 That was
glaringly evident with respect to mixed schools. Despite Sumner's unceasing
efforts to obtain legislation mandating unsegregated schools,80 he failed to
have them included in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which provided for equal
accommodations in inns and public conveyances.
Dimond does not dispute these facts; instead he relies upon the "general-
ity" of the amendment and upon statutes subsequent to the amendment to
exhibit the framers' "understanding that it covered a broad range of state
behavior." 8' With the exception of the 1875 Act, the acts he lists were direct-
ed at violence and intimidation. 82 Mixed schools, our litmus test, had been
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 126.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 202 (1970).
78. Id. at 157. "[Elven abolitionists were anxious to disclaim any intention of forcing social contacts
between the races .. " W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS 286 (1963).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1869).
80. Dimond, supra note 3, at 503; see also infra text accompanying note 88.
81. Dimond, supra note 3, at 481.
82. Id. at 478-80. For example, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was aimed at "'the states' failure to
protect... freedmenfrom rule by Klan terror," id. at 479, "against violence," id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE,41st
Cong., 3d Sess. 1276 (1871)), thereby denying them "the equal protection of the laws." Id. (quoting CON3.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 78, 80(1871)). As will appear, "equal protection" was constantly associated
with specifically enumerated rights.
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deleted from the 1875 proposals; 83 before long the entire 1875 Act was invali-
dated by the Civil Rights Cases. 84 Moreover, the Court has said that "the
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent
of an earlier one." 83 More relevant is the explanation of Senator Aaron A.
Sargent of California in 1875 that the common schools proposal would
reinforce "what may perhaps be an unreasonable prejudice, but a
prejudice ... powerful, permeating every part of the country, and existing
more or less in every man's mind.", 86 In the House William Phelps of New
Jersey stated, "[Y]ou are trying to legislate against human prejudice and you
cannot do it. No enactment will root out prejudice." 87
Dimond acknowledges that "[t]he lack of popular support for mixed
schools generally frustrated Sumner's eight-year campaign in Congress to
legislate specifically against separate schools." '' But he extenuates, "Con-
gress also has repeatedly refused to declare that it would be unconstitutional
to pass such legislation." 8 9 It suffices that Congress, responding to popular
sentiment, rejected such legislation. Moreover, "[N]onaction," the Supreme
Court held, "affords the most dubious foundation for drawing positive infer-
ences." 96 Segregation proposals, Dimond asserts, were rejected not "be-
cause Congress considered segregation ... to be beyond the scope of the
fourteenth amendment, but because passage was politically impossible at that
time." 9' What was "politically impossible" in 1875 was even less possible in
1866.92 Not surprisingly, Sumner "placed little stress upon the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws; too many of his
colleagues who had helped draft that ambiguous document would reply that
they had never intended to outlaw segregation." ' 93 He had relied rather on
"the Sermon on the Mount and ... the Declaration of Independence." 94 As
William Gillette said of suffrage, less unpalatable to the electorate than mixed
83. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311,329,331 (1979).
84. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Dimond facilely disposes of these cases on the ground that the Act imposed duties on
private individuals rather than public officials. Although the Court found no occasion to pass on whether there
was a right to equal accommodations in inns and public conveyances, id. at 19, it was at pains to say that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 dealt with "fundamental rights," e.g., "the same right to make and enforce contracts, to
sue ... and to inherit, purchase ... property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Id. at 22. "Congress did not
assume.., to adjust what may be called the social rights of men ..... Id. There is no indication in the parallel
history of the amendment that it undertook to do so by the amendment.
85. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). It is one thing to cite framers in a subsequent Congress
to confirm views expressed in the 1866 Congress, and something else again when the framers attempt to change
their testimony upon which the 39th Congress relied.
86. 3 CONG. REC., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 4172 (1874).
87. Id. at 1002.
88. Dimond, supra note 3, at 503.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960).
91. Dimond, supra note 3, at 502-03.
92. Russell Nye observed that the Reconstruction made no "basic changes in the prevailing attitudes
toward race ... attitudes clearly reflected in the congressional politics of Reconstruction." Nye, Comment on
C. V. Woodward's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 156 (H. Hyman ed.
1966).
93. D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 532 (1970).
94. Id.
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schools, "Most congressmen apparently did not intend to risk drowning by
swimming against the treacherous current of racial prejudice and opposition
to Negro suffrage." 95 The notion that the framers, who shared the racism of
their constituents, 96 would secrete in the "general terms" of the amendment
authorization for future encroachments on state control of segregation is
sheer fantasy.
II. THE OBJECT OF RECONSTRUCTION REDRESS
For light on "the purpose of Reconstruction law generally and of the
equal protection clause in particular," 97 Dimond commendably looks to the
"'sorts of evils against which the provision was directed."' 98 He quotes
Senator Henry Wilson's explanation that adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment would "obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its
chattelizing, degrading, and bloody codes."' 9 The Black Codes, Dimond ex-
plains, sought "to maintain blacks as a servile class,"'00 to "relegate blacks to
virtual peonage." 0 ' He notices that they "excluded blacks from voting, own-
ing land, making contracts, securing access to the courts, working without a
license, traveling without a pass, or engaging in certain trades."' 02 With the
exception of voting these were the very "sorts of evils" that the Civil Rights
Act was intended to remedy and did so almost in those very terms: section
one of the Civil Rights Bill provided
[t]hat there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities... on account
of race... but... [all] shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue ... to inherit, purchase... and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
103propery ....
The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, James Wilson of Iowa,
asked whether those terms
mean that in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race
or color, shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed .... I understand
civil rights to be simply. . . "[t]he right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property." 104
95. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 25 (1965).
96. In the Senate John Sherman of Ohio said, "'[W]e do not like Negroes. We do not conceal our dislike."
C. V. Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECON-
STRUCTION (H. Hyman ed. 1966); see also M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 67 (1977).
97. Dimond, supra note 3, at 472.
98. Id. (quoting J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 13 (1980)).
99. Dimond, supra note 3, at 473 n.56.
100. Id. at 474.
101. Id. at 475.
102. Id. at 474.
103. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 474.
104. Id. at 1117; this was a quotation from Kent. Wilson later reemphasized the exclusion of school and
jury laws, id. at 1294.
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Bickel comments, "Wilson thus presented the Civil Rights Bill to the House
as a measure of limited and definite objectives. In this he followed the lead of
the majority in the Senate .... And the line he laid down was followed by
others who spoke for the bill in the House."1 05 For example, Martin Thayer of
Pennsylvania observed, "[W]hen those civil rights which are first referred to
in general terms... are subsequently enumerated, that enumeration pre-
cludes any possibility that the general words which have been used can be
extended beyond the particulars which have been enumerated."'0 "The sole
purpose of the bill," he emphasized, was "to secure" those "fundamental
rights." 7 Senator William M. Stewart explained that the Bill was designed
"simply to remove the disabilities existing by laws tending to reduce the
negro to a system of peonage. It strikes at that; nothing else.... That is the
whole scope of the law." 03
Nevertheless, Dimond asserts that "the 1866 Act responded to evils
extending beyond such express discrimination, "'09 that Berger "fails to rec-
ognize the sweep of the evil that the 1866 Act addressed." "0 Apparently he
rests on the charge that Berger "ignor[ed] the significance of the Codes'
facially neutral provisions.""' By "facially neutral" Dimond means that the
Codes "applied on their face to blacks and whites alike";" 2 hence, he argues
that the Act's "goals" were not as "limited" as Berger claims, but "respond-
ed to evils extending beyond such express discrimination[s]" enumerated in
the Act. 113 He mentions no "evils" other than those of the Black Codes and
the periodic violence during the Reconstruction, and fails to distinguish be-
tween the persons to whom the Codes applied and the specific "evils," the
"acts of racial discrimination" made possible by the Codes. Inclusion of the
whites in the Codes was merely window dressing to disguise discrimination in
the application; it did not enlarge the "sweep" of the remedy that the Act
strikingly patterned on the very "evils" Dimond found. Against his specula-
tions there is the statement of James W. Patterson of New Hampshire, who
was "opposed to any law discriminating against [blacks] in the security and
105. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1955).
Alfred Kelly wrote that Wilson "declared for a narrow interpretation ofthe measure in enequivocal terms .... "
Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1066
(1956).
106. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1151. Immediately prior thereto, he had explained "fundamental rights" in
terms of "the right to make and enforce contracts" and so forth. Id. at 1151.
107. Id. at 1152.
108. Id. at 1785 (emphasis added).
109. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477.
110. Id. at 475 (emphasis in original).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 474. From the inclusion of whites Dimond leaps to the conclusion that the banned "discrimina-
tion included facially neutral laws that failed to redress private combinations. " Id. at 476 (emphasis added). His
citations to Ely and Soifer have no bearing on "private combinations." The Civil Rights Bill reached "any
person who under cover of law" deprived another of rights secured by the Act. GLOBE, supra note 32, at S.211.
When Wilson was asked why the coverage was not extended to the "whole community," he replied, "We are
not making a general criminal code for the States." Id. at 1120.
113. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477. See also id. at 476.
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protection of life, liberty, person [and] property," but said, "Beyond this I am
not prepared to go .... ",i So, too, William Windom of Minnesota declared
that the Civil Rights Bill conferred an "equal right, nothing more ... to
make ... contracts" and the like." 5
Next Dimond argues that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "dealt with the
specific wrongs that Congress thought should be outlawed at that time.
... Decades or centuries later, however, the manifestations of such discrim-
ination might be quite different .... Thus, even an amendment incorporating
'only' the thrust of the 1866 Act could authorize different applications than
those enumerated in the Act." 116 This confounds application of a principle to
new facts with the Court's replacement of the framers' principle by its own. It
is widely agreed that the framers excluded suffrage and segregation from the
scope of the amendment. To argue that segregation may now be barred be-
cause conditions have changed is to obliterate the exclusory "principle," not
to apply it to new facts. Moreover, since the Act addressed "specific
wrongs"-namely, violence and oppression-its provisions may not be warp-
ed to embrace education, which undeniably was left untouched. Chief Justice
Marshall declared that the words of the Constitution are not to be "extended
to objects not ... contemplated by its framers," "' let alone objects con-
sciously excluded.
IV. THE TEXT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: "CODE WORDS"
With respect to the three clauses of the fourtenth amendment-privileges
or immunities, equal protection, and due process-Dimond goes to great
lengths to show that Bingham, draftsman of the amendment, "is not a plaus-
ible candidate for framing a constitutional amendment using code words with
the narrow, precise meanings suggested by Berger," '"8 adducing among other
things that Bingham "argued in broad, sometimes rambling terms" "9 respect-
ing "'the rights of the people." 20 Yet Bingham flatly stated that "[e]very
word of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution," ' 2' "exactly
in the language of the Constitution," '22 referring to "the language of the
second section of the fourth article, and a portion of the fifth amendment,"
which he quoted. 2 Since two of the clauses employed "words of art," as will
114. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2699.
115. Id . at 1159.
116. Dimond, supra note 3, at 476 (emphasis added).
117. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (dissenting opinion).
118. Dimond, supra note 3, at 485 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 494.
120. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 85 (1871)). Because Berger allegedly "views
Bingham as a Negrophobe" whereas "Fairman calls Bingham an incurably muddle-headed thinker," Dimond
concludes, "Such wide-ranging views of Bingham" rebut "any claim that Bingham framed the fourteenth
amendment as a code to be interpreted as a term of art," Dimond at 481-82 (emphasis in original), a manifest non
sequitur.
121. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1034.
122. Id. at 1095.
123. Id. at 1034.
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appear, it matters little what he conceived them to mean, whether he "framed
the fourteenth amendment as a code to be interpreted as a term of art," 4
because his hearers were entitled to attach to due process, for example, its
common-law meaning.25 Considering that, as Dimond observes, "the flood of
[Bingham's] rhetoric" may "sometimes have obscured his vision," 26 how
much more must it have obscured the understanding of his listeners.
Dimond's generalities furnish so little light on what the framers actually de-
cided as to necessitate a summary of the historical data under the respective
clauses whereby to measure his "evidence." But first it is essential to note
that three words-life, liberty, or property-are woven through the debates
on the Act and the amendment and may be regarded as the link that binds the
three clauses of the amendment together.
A. "Life, Liberty, or Property"
Dimond takes exception to my view that the three clauses of the amend-
ment present "three facets of one and the same concern."' 2 7 This concern, I
wrote, was
to insure that there would be no discrimination against the freedmen in respect of
"fundamental rights," which had clearly understood and narrow compass. Rough-
ly speaking, the substantive rights were identified by the privileges or immunities
clause; the equal protection clause was to bar legislative discrimination with re-
spect to those rights; and the judicial machinery to secure them was to be supplied
by nondiscriminatory due process of the several States. Charles Sumner summar-
ized these radical goals: let the Negro have "the shield of impartial laws. Let him
be heard in court.'
' 28
For the "principal spokesmen" and theorists of the abolitionist movement,
Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany, "privileges and immunities" meant that a
citizen has a right "to full and ample protection in the enjoyment of his
personal security, personal liberty, and private property ... protection
against oppression ... against lawless violence."' 2 9 Early on, James Garfield
stated in the House that the goal was that "personal liberty and personal
rights are placed in the keeping of the nation; that the right to life, liberty and
property shall be guarantied to the citizen in reality .... ,, 130 In explaining
124. Dimond, supra note 3, at 482.
125. His fellow radical, William Higby of California, understood that the article IV clause and the fifth
amendment due process clause constituted "precisely what will be provided" by the Bingham amendment.
GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1054. Another radical, William Woodbridge of Ohio, stated, "It is intended to enable
Congress by its enactments when necessary to give a citizen... those privileges and immunities which are
guarantied to him under the Constitution [article IV] ... that protection to his property which is extended [by
the due process clause]." Id. at 1088.
126. Dimond, supra note 3, at 494. Stanley Morrison concluded that Bingham's "many state-
ments ... are so confused and so conflicting as to be of little weight." Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 161 (1949). For details
see Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 435, 449, 453, 461-64 (1981).
127. Dimond, supra note 3, at 465.
128. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at 675).
129. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 108, 110 (1965) (emphasis added).
130. GLOBE, supra note 32, at app. 67.
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the scope of the Civil Rights Bill, James Wilson, its manager, quoted Black-
stone for the rights that "belong to Englishmen": (1) "The right of personal
security," (2) "The right of personal liberty. . . " consisting, according to
Blackstone, in "the power of locomotion.., moving one's person to what-
ever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or re-
straint, unless by due course of law," and (3) "The right of personal proper-
ty . .. ," 131 And Wilson emphasized that the rights enumerated in the Civil
Rights Bill were no "greater than the rights which are included in the general
term 'life, liberty, and property.' 1 32 It is an index of Dimond's scholarly
trustworthiness that he describes this as Berger's "tortured path back to the
different 'fundamental rights' of Blackstone," 33 apparently unaware of the
interpretive canon that "the statements of those who supported the legislation
and secured its passage will be accepted as determining its meaning,"134 so
that Wilson's quotation of Blackstone defines the goal. Wilson left no doubt
about the purpose of the Bill. Referring to "the right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property," he said,
"[T]hese are the rights which this bill proposes to protect ....
William Lawrence advised the 39th Congress that judicial construction
had "confined" the "privileges and immunities" to those "which were in
their nature fundamental ... the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to
acquire and possess property." 136 Commenting on Bingham's proposed
amendment, Wilson referred to the due process-life, liberty, or property-
clause in the Bill of Rights and stated, "[T]hese constitute the civil
rights ... and these are the rights to which this bill relates . . . ." 117 That
amendment, said Frederick Woodbridge of Vermont, was intended for "pro-
tection [for] his [the Negro's] property which is extended" by the due process
clause. 138 Bingham explained that the "equal protection" clause provided that
state protection "shall be equal in respect to life and liberty and property to all
persons," "nothing else." 39 Further illustrations of the framers' all but ex-
clusive preoccupation with protection of life, liberty, and property will appear
in the particularized discussion of the three clauses.
Against this Dimond urges that
the syntax suggests that the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" is separ-
ate from, and not limited to, "privileges or immunities" and procedural fairness
131. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1118; Wilson also cited Kent for these three rights, id., as did William
Lawrence, id. at 1833. Dimond states, however, "These rights were supposedly enumerated in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act .... " Dimond, supra note 3, at 466 n. 19 (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes
157-58.
132. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1295 (emphasis added).
133. Dimond, supra note 3, at 466.
134. Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 1951).
135. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1117.
136. Id. at 1835-36 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1088.
139. Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
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concerning "life, liberty or property." By its terms, the equal protection clause
imposes additional duties on the states, apart from the privileges or immunities
and due process clauses.
40
But the age-old rule, repeated by Judge Learned Hand, is that if the legislative
purpose is "manifest" it "override[s] even the explicit words used," ' 4' let
alone the "syntax." At another point Dimond argues that the "precise mean-
ing, if any, that Bingham intended by use of the phrase 'life, liberty, or
property' is unclear." 4 2 Whatever the private meaning that he may have
attached to terms he confessedly borrowed from article IV and the fifth
amendment, it cannot overcome the traditional meaning called by Wilson to
the attention of the framers. In fact, however, Bingham, like his fellows,
identified "life, liberty, or property" with the Blackstonian cluster of
rights. '4
B. "Due Process of Law"
The amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Indubitably, "due process
of law" are code words. Summarizing 400 years of English and colonial law,
Hamilton said on the eve of the Convention: "The words 'due process' have a
precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceed-
ings of the courts of justice. They can never be referred to an act of the
Legislature. "'44 "Substantive" due process was therefore outside the phrase.
Charles P. Curtis, an admirer of expansive review, wrote that the meaning of
"due process of law" in the fifth amendment "was as fixed and definite as the
common law could make a phrase .... It meant procedural due process." 
45
Dimond recognizes that in 1862 the "commonly accepted" view was that the
"fifth amendment due process clause... applied to procedure, not sub-
stance.' 46 In the fourteenth amendment the phrase, the Supreme Court
stated, "was used in the same sense and to no greater extent."'' 47
The clause responded to the fact, noted by Dimond, that blacks were
denied access to the courts;'48 the framers were concerned that they had been
"denied process of law to enforce the right and avenge the wrong," 49 and
were anxious that they might be "denied remedy in the courts." 50 The chair-
140. Dimond, supra note 3, at 467 (emphasis in original).
141. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959).
142. Dimond, supra note 3, at 486 n.126.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
144. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Syrett & Cooke eds. 1962); see Berger, The Four-
teenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 334 (1979). Judge William Lawrence, one
of the framers, quoted the Hamilton definition in 1871. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (1871).
145. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 170, 177 (E. Cahn ed.
1954).
146. Dimond, supra note 3, at 484-85.
147. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
148. See supra text accompanying note 102.
149. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1263 (quoting John P. Broomall).
150. Id. at 1265.
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man of the House Judiciary Committee, James Wilson, asked whether "if a
State intervenes and deprives him [a black], without due process of law, of
these rights"-"life, liberty, or property"-"have we no power to make him
secure in these priceless possessions?"' 5' Another framer, James Garfield of
Ohio, who had restudied the 1866 debates, stated in 1871 that the fourteenth
amendment "is copied from the fifth," and he defined it as "an impartial trial
according to the laws of the land," 52 as had been adumbrated by Senator
Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania in the 1866 debates. 53 Bingham said that the
meaning of the clause had been "settled" by the courts "long ago.- 15 Al-
though these materials were available to Dimond, he refers to "Berger's view
that due process could mean no process."' 55 He furnishes no citation and can
cite none for this grotesque attribution. In short, "due process of law" were
code words and were so understood by Bingham, though that is irrelevant
given that the framers could rely on the accepted meaning of the words.
C. The "Privileges or Immunities" Clause
The phrase entered the fourteenth amendment via the Civil Rights Act of
1866:
there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities ... [all] inhabit-
ants ... shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts [etc.] ... and to
full and equal benefit of all laws for the security of person and property. 6
Why, it may be asked, did the framers choose that enumeration instead of the
"code words" "life, liberty, or property"? One answer may be that the
enumeration responded precisely to the evils, listed by Dimond, of the Black
Codes. Another is the explanation furnished by William Lawrence of Ohio,
who reiterated that blacks were entitled to personal security, personal liberty,
and the right to acquire property:
It is idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to
labor, whereby alone he can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a
right to live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege
and the rewards of labor. 57
"These," he said, were the "necessary incidents of these absolute rights." 1
58
Martin Thayer of Pennsyvania averred that "to avoid any misapprehension"
as to what the "fundamental rights" are, "they are stated in the bill. The same
section goes on to define with greater particularity the civil rights and immun-
ities which are to be protected by the bill." 159
151. Id. at 1294. For additional citations see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 201-02.
152. CONG. GLOBE APP. 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1871).
153. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2899 (no punishment "unless by a fair trial... in due course of law").
154. Id. at 1089.
155. Dimond, supra note 3, at 467 (emphasis in original).
156. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 474 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 1833.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1151. See also statement of Sen. Sherman, infra text accompanying note 164.
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The terms "privileges and immunities" are first met in article IV of the
Articles of Confederation; it provided that "the people of the different states
in this union. . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several states," specifying "all the privileges of trade or com-
merce." 160 For the Founders, the enumerated "privileges of trade or com-
merce" limited the general words "privileges and immunities." 16  That
phrase was picked up by article IV of the Constitution, and very early the
courts of Maryland and Massachusetts construed them in terms of trade and
commerce.'62 After reading from the several cases, Senator Trumbull, drafts-
man of the Bill, stated that "the great fundamental rights set forth in this bill
[are] the right to acquire property, the right to come and go at pleasure, the
right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and
dispose of property. These are the very rights set forth in this Bill," "63 as its
text corroborates. Senator John Sherman said the bill "defines what are the
incidents of freedom, and says that these men must be protected in certain
rights, and so careful is it in its language that it goes on and defines those
rights, the right to sue and be sued,"and so forth.'64 Quoting Kent, Chairman
Wilson said, "I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of
individuals, such as-'The right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property," " 65 emphasizing that the
enumerated rights were no "greater than the rights which are included in the
general term 'life, liberty, and property.'"66
Notwithstanding these assurances, Bingham protested that the "civil
rights and immunities" phrase was "oppressive," that it would "embrace
every right" and strike down "every State constitution which makes a dis-
crimination on account of race or color in any of the civil rights of the cit-
izen." 167 At his insistence the phrase was deleted, in order, as James Wilson
160. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY III (7th ed. 1963).
161. Madison wrote, "For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common
than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars." THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 41 at 269 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
162. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92
(1827). Dimond prefers a rambling dictum of Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit in Corfield v. Coryeil, 6 F.
Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Dimond, supra note 3, at 498. For an analysis of Corfield see
R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 31-33. Dimond relies on J. H. Ely, who "cogently comments" that "read in
context what Washington says, in essence, is that he feels 'no hesitation in confining' privileges and immunities
to everything but the kitchen sink." Dimond, supra note 3, at 498 n. 195 (quoting J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 198 n.64 (1980)). But read in the context of what was decided-a Pennsylvania citizen may not
dredge for oysters in Delaware waters-the reference to the "kitchen sink" is absurd. Washington did throw in
the right to vote, but that was arrant nonsense. No visitor from Pennsylvania could claim the right to vote in
Delaware without establishing domicile, so that Senator Trumbull was constrained to say, "This judge goes
further than the bill" in including "the elective franchise." GLOBE, supra note 32, at 475. What counts is how
Trumbull read the cases, infra text accompanying note 163, not Ely's reading of Corfield.
163. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 475.
164. Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 1117.
166. Id. at 1295.
167. Id. at 1291 (emphasis added).
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explained, to obviate a "construction going beyond the specific rights named
in the section," a "latitudinarian construction not intended." "f8 Dimond
reads this account as my charge that Bingham was a "Negrophobe,"1 69
whereas I viewed it as a "States' Rights manifesto," which in Dimond's eyes
is "exaggerate[d]." 70 He considers that Bingham's objections were two: (1)
lack of constitutional authorization to legislate on civil rights, and (2) the
injustice of penalizing state officials who relied on long-standing state law. '7
That is not how the Court read the deletion:
The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to
protect a limited category of rights .... mhe Senate bill did contain a general
provision forbidding "discrimination in civil rights or immunities," preceding the
specific enumeration of rights .... Objections were raised in the legislative de-
bates to the breadth of the rights of racial equality that might be encompassed by a
prohibition so general .... [A]n amendment was accepted striking the phrase from
the bill. 7
Soifer, one of Dimond's authorities, wrote that the deletion dismayed the
"historians assisting Thurgood Marshall and his legal team in Brown v. Board
of Education"73 because, as Richard Kluger relates, "In calling for the dele-
tion, Bingham, the former abolition theorist, had openly acknowledged that
the bill as drafted would have prohibited statutes such as school segrega-
tion"; 74 Bingham's insistence on deletion rejected such an invasion of state
sovereignty.
The thinking of Bingham with respect to "privileges or immunities" was
actually in accord with that of his fellows. In 1859, Dimond recounts,
Bingham opposed the admission of Oregon because "limitations on travel,
ownership of property, and access to the courts deprived blacks of the 'priv-
168. Id. at 1366. Wilson, however, had firmly rejected Bingham's over-broad reading of"civil rights," id. at
1294, but presumably yielded to obviate needless political conflict.
Dimond argues that "if the phrase 'privileges or immunities' is supposed to be a term of art for 'civil rights'
[citation omitted] then John Bingham unequivocally expressed his understanding that the phrase embraced all
'social' and 'political rights .... "' Dimond, supra note 3, at490 n. 145. His understanding was not shared by his
fellows, supra note 69. Moreover, his own shift from "civil rights" to the historic "privileges or immunities"
insured a narrower compass.
169. Dimond, supra note 3, at 481.
170. Id. at 486 n. 124. Dimond notes, however, that "Bingham attempted to minimize the damage to his
view of federalism and state responsibility by proposing that Congress delete the sentence providing for 'no
discrimination in civil rights' (thereby limiting the Bill to the enumerated rights)." Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
A Reconstruction historian, Alfred Kelly, who helped the NAACP frame the strategy of the desegregation
case, conceded a decade later that "the commitment to traditional state-federal relations [state sovereignty]
meant that the radical Negro reform program could be only a very limited one." Kelly, Comment on Harold M.
Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 55 (1966). Bickel concluded that
"Bingham, while committing himself to the need for safeguarding by constitutional amendment the specific
rights enumerated in the body of section 1, was anything but willing to make similar commitment with respect to
'civil rights' in general." Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1, 24 (1955).
171. Dimond, supra note 3, at 486 n.124.
172. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966) (emphasis added).
173. Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 685
n. 169 (1979).
174. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 640 (1976).
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ileges and immunities' of national citizenship. "' 75 In 1862 "Bingham repeated
his claim that free blacks" were entitled to "state protection of their priv-
ileges or immunities, life, liberty, and property."' 76 In 1866, Dimond contin-
ues, Bingham stated that "'the word immunity ... means [e]xemption from
unequal burdens,' such as the racial restrictions imposed by Oregon
... which he had opposed in 1859." '7 Dimond sums up in a splendid
non sequitur: "Bingham, therefore, did not limit 'privileges and immunities,'
'life, liberty or property,' and 'equal protection' to Berger's 'fundamental
rights' concerning the security of person and property."78
Against this mass of unequivocal explanations, Dimond maintains the
words are "amorphous": 179 Senator Howard "expressed puzzlement over
the precise meaning, if any, of the privileges or immunities clause." "o It is a
"puzzlement" that betrays inattention to the explanation by Senator
Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, of the meaning of the
terms. Howard's participation in the framing of the Civil Rights Act and the
fourteenth amendment had been negligible, and he was called on to speak
only because of the sudden illness of Senator Fessenden, chairman of the
Joint Committee. His puzzlement cannot weigh in the scales against the fact
that "privileges or immunities" were words of art because they had been
judicially construed and those constructions were called to the framers' atten-
tion by Chairman Trumbull. William Lawrence observed that "the courts
have by construction limited the words 'all privileges' to mean only 'some
privileges,' 181 noting that they were "'confined to those [privileges and
immunities] which were in their nature fundamental ... the rights of protec-
tion of life and liberty, and to acquire and enjoy property."' 182
On the basis of much thinner evidence the Court, per Justice Harlan,
declared, "[W]e should not assume that Congress... used the words 'advo-
cate' and 'teach' in their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already
been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation."' 8 3
Speaking after Howard, Senator Luke Poland said that the clause "se-
cures nothing beyond what was intended by the original [article IV] provision
in the Constitution. "184 Nor was Howard's "puzzlement" shared by con-
temporary Justices. Justice Bradley held that the particularization of the Act
175. Dimond, supra note 3, at 484. Bingham's reference "to national citizenship" is further evidence of his
careless reading. Article IV provides that "[tihe citizens of each State shall be entitled .... It was borrowed in
haec verba from the Articles of Confederation; the Confederation was a league of sovereign states.
176. Dimond, supra note 3, at 484 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 487-88 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1089-90).
178. Dimond, supra note 3, at 488.
179. Id. at 487.
180. Id. at 497.
181. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1835.
182. Id. at 1835-36.
183. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957). Chief Justice Taney stated, "The members of the
Convention unquestionably used the words they inserted in the Constitution in the same sense in which they
used them in their debates." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 477 (1849) (dissenting opinion).
184. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2961 (emphasis added).
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was incorporated in the privileges or immunities clause--the first section of
the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment." 185 Led by
Justice Field, four dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases declared that
"[iun the first section of the Civil Rights Act Congress has given its interpreta-
tion to these terms [privileges or immunities] ... [including] the right 'to
make and enforce contracts [etc.]."' 1 86 The majority, comparing article IV
and the fourteenth amendment, stated, "There can be but little question
that ... the privileges and immunities intended are the same in each
[case]."'87 Not the least remarkable aspect of Dimond's "refutation" is that
he perceives no need to account for such discrepant facts.
D. "Equal Protection"
Dimond's discussion of equal protection is vitiated by several basic mis-
conceptions. The "common understanding of the vagueness" of the language,
he maintains, places the burden on Berger to prove that it "was intended to
enumerate specific, narrow protections against racial discrimination. "88 But
curtailment of state control of local matters reserved to them by the tenth
amendment requires clear, not vague, language; and the burden is on those
who urge that the "vague" language was intended to authorize the curtail-
ment.' 89 Another misconception resides in his rejection of "Berger's view
[that] 'equal protection' bars only racially partial state statutes that provide
one of these fundamental rights to whites but not to blacks. "'90 Only one who
gallops heedlessly to a predetermined result could overlook that the framers'
sole aim was to preclude discrimination with respect to certain rights. The
very words "equal protection" posit discrimination. A steady drumbeat on
discrimination pervades the record. To begin with, the Civil Rights Act ex-
pressly prohibited "discrimination in civil rights or immunities"--a provision
that was still too broad for Bingham-and went on to provide for the "same
185. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co.,
15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
186. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872).
187. Id. at 75. Perry concluded that by "privileges or immunities" the framers
meant only to protect, against state action discriminating on the basis of race, a narrow category of
"fundamental" rights: those pertaining to the physical security of one's person, freedom of movement,
and capacity to make contracts.. and to acquire, hold, and transfer chattels and land--"life, liberty,
and property" in the original sense.
Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHiO ST. L.J. 261, 273 (1981).
Ignoring the effect of the Yates "words of art" rule, supra text accompanying note 183, and the Smythe v.
Reiche pari inateria rule, infra text accompanying note 203, Dimond argues that the evidence "does not show
that the privileges or immunities clause was intended to have a precisely limited scope or that it incorporates
only the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act." Dimond, supra note 3, at 501. A lawyer who ignores
adverse evidence labors in vain.
188. Dimond, supra note 3, at 464.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. It is to be borne in mind that Madison assured the ratifiers
that the federal "jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 249 (Mod. Lib. Ed.
1937) (emphasis added).
190. Dimond, supra note 3, at 466.
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rights" as whites enjoyed.' 9' Stevens, who, according to Dimond, "pushed
the equality principle to its limits,"'92 had offered an amendment providing
for "[n]o racial discrimination in civil rights. "'93 And in explaining the four-
teenth amendment, as Dimond notes, Stevens said: "Whatever law punishes
a white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way
and to the same degree. "'94 Dimond comments, "After giving some examples
of existing racial discrimination, Stevens added, 'I need not enumerate these
partial and oppressive laws [Black Codes]." 95 Unless restrained, he contin-
ued, the Southern States will "keep up this discrimination, and crush to death
the hated freedmen."'96 This modest goal of striking at violence and oppres-
sion is translated by Dimond as "push[ing] the equality principle to its
limits"! The record is studded with references to discrimination as the goal,
and the interested reader will find them collected in my index under the
heading "Discrimination. "' 97 Here let it suffice that Chairman Trumbull twice
told the Senate that in the absence of discrimination the Civil Rights Bill
would not apply. Very early he explained that the Bill "will have no operation
in any State where the laws are equal, where all persons have the same civil
rights without regard to race or color. "'98 And after Johnson's veto of the Bill,
Trumbull reiterated that it "in no manner interferes with the municipal regula-
tions of any State which protects all alike in their rights of person and proper-
ty." 199
Unlike "due process," which had an established "procedural" content
at common law, and "privileges or immunities," which had a history and
judicial constructions that were read to the framers, "equal protection" had
no antecedents in the text or history of the Constitution. In that case, "[I]f
words are used which seem to have no fixed signification," Senator Sumner
advised the framers, "we cannot err if we turn to the framers ....,,200
Throughout the debates on the Civil Rights Bill, which, it will be recalled,
secured only the "equal benefit of all laws for security of person and proper-
ty," the framers interchangeably referred to "equality before the law" and
"equal protection," but always in the circumscribed context of the rights
enumerated in the Bill.2' l So, Samuel Shellabarger said, "[W]hatever rights as
to each of these enumerated civil (not political) matters the States may confer
upon one race ... shall be held by all races in equality.... It se-
191. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 474. In his conclusion, however, Dimond alludes to "the general antidis-
crimination obligations" imposed by the fourteenth amendment. Dimond, supra note 3, at 511.
192. Dimond, supra note 3, at 495.
193. Id. at 491.
194. Id. at 496 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2459-60).
195. Dimond, supra note 3, at 496.
196. Id. (quoting GLOBE, at 2459-60) (emphasis added).
197. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 454.
198. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 476.
199. Id. at 1761; see also statements of Senator William Stewart, id. at 1785.
200. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 677.
201. For example, Samuel Moulton of Illinois said each state "shall provide for equality.before the law,
equal protection to life, liberty, and property, equal right to sue and be sued." Id. at 1622.
[Vol. 43:285
HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
cures ... equality of protection in those enumerated civil rights. ' 202 Under
the pari materia rule, this meaning is to be given the words in the "identical"
amendment. 20 3 This was the content the words had for the framers, and it
renders idle Dimond's speculations as to the meaning of the "vague" terms.
In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "Legal doctrines... derive meaning
and content from the circumstances that gave rise to them and from the
purposes they were designed to serve. To these they are bound as is a live tree
to its roots.',204 Dimond himself notices that the Joint Committee of Fifteen
on Reconstruction, draftsmen of the fourteenth amendment, "reported exten-
sively on the evils of these Black Codes," 2 5 and noted the "deep-seated
prejudice against color" that "leads to acts of cruelty, oppression and mur-
der, which the local authorities are at no pains to prevent or punish." 206 And
he properly concluded, "Section 1 was designed to redress this denial by the
states of the equal protection of their laws." 207 Other than protection of this
right to exist by contracting, owning property, or suing, Dimond would be at a
loss to cite a reference to equal protection of any other rights. 20" To the
contrary, the framers constantly associated "protection" and "equal protec-
tion" with the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act, themselves incidents
of "life, liberty or property."
Dimond argues, however, that "Bingham nowhere suggested that equal
protection should be ... tied only to 'privileges or immunities' and 'life,
liberty or property.' . . . [N]or did he recant his view that the term 'civil
rights' included all 'social' and 'political rights ..... 209 His view of "civil
rights" was not shared by his fellows.2 0 In the Senate Trumbull emphasized
that the Bill "carefully avoided conferring or interfering with political rights
or privileges of any kind., 21 1 Moreover, Bingham, who had objected that
202. Id. at 1293 (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162 (1871); see also supra note 183 and accompanying
text.
In a characteristic exaggeration Dimond asserts that "Berger views the phrases 'privileges or immunities,'
'due process,' and 'equal protection of the laws' as terms of art to which the framers attached 'received
meanings' virtually as specific as the provision in article II limiting the Presidency to 'natural born citizens' who
'have attained the age of thirty five years."' Dimond, supra note 3, at 465. The inept illustration betrays
incapacity to distinguish the "received" procedural meaning of due process, and the association of privileges or
immunities with the rights of "person and property," from specificity in the extreme, a 35-year age limit.
204. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 (1957) (concurring).
205. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477. See also supra note 69.
206. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477 (quoting REPORT OFTHE JOINT COMMITrEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 2
H.R. REP. NO. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. XVII (1866)).
207. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477-78.
208. I put to one side the utterances of Bingham and Howard respecting incorporation of the Bill of Rights
in the fourteenth amendment. Reliance on these remarks by Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 73 (1947) (dissenting), has never been accepted by the Court, and the bulk of academic opinion is to the same
effect. For citations see Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
261, n.105 (1981).
209. Dimond, supra note 3, at 492.
210. The manager of the Civil Rights Bill, Wilson, firmly rejected Bingham's reading. GLOBE, supra note
32, at 1294.
211. Id. at 1760; see supra note 69.
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"civil rights" was too broad and oppressive, discarded "civil rights" in favor
of "privileges," which in conjunction with "immunities" had an historically
limited meaning.
Let Bingham refute Dimond as to the tie between equal protection and
"life, liberty, or property." Speaking in 1859, Bingham, then a leading aboli-
tionist theorist, declared,
Nobody proposes or dreams of political equality any more than of physical or
mental equality. It is as impossible for men to establish equality in these respects
as it is for "the Ethiopian to change his skin" .... Who, on the other hand, will
be bold enough to deny all persons are equally entitled to the enjoyment of the
rights of life and liberty and property.
2.. [A]ll men, before the law, are equal in respect of those rights of per-
son.
He acted on these principles in shaping his draft of the amendment. In an
early version provision was made for both "the same political rights and
privileges; and ... equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and prop-
erty, ' ' z13 testimony that "equal protection" did not embrace "political
rights." Bingham proposed a substitute, H.R. No. 63, that would empower
Congress "to secure... all privileges and immunities ... [and] equal pro-
tection in the rights of life, liberty and property.", 214 "Political rights and
privileges" had been deleted; in its place was "privileges and immunities,"
which never had embraced "political rights." Bingham explained that his
proposal would enable Congress to insure "that the protection given by the
laws of the States shall be equal in respect to life and liberty and property to
all persons., 215 When Robert Hale of New York asked him to point to the
clause on which he relied, Bingham replied, "The words 'equal protection'
contain it, and nothing else.- 21 6 That statement alone reduces to rubble
Dimond's assertion that "Bingham nowhere suggested that equal protection
should be limited to. . . 'life, liberty, or property.' ,,2 7 Moreover, Dimond
misconceives the governing rule: having throughout associated "protection"
and "equal protection" with "life, liberty, or property" and "privileges or
immunities," Bingham was not required to exclude other rights and priv-
ileges, the test being rather that of Chief Justice Marshall: The terms of the
Constitution are not to be "extended to objects not ... contemplated by its
framers."
218
212. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). As early as 1857, Bingham had said, "This is
equality. It protects not only life and liberty, but also property, the product of labor. It contemplates that no man
shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than of his life." CONG. GLOBE APP. 34th Cong.,
3d Sess. 140 (1857).
213. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1955).
214. Id. at 33.
215. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1094 (emphasis added).
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Dimond, supra note 3, at 492.
218. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (dissenting); see also Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
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V. FROM SPECIFIC TO GENERAL LANGUAGE
Like his fellow activists, Dimond relies heavily on the fact that "[tihe
language of the fourteenth amendment ... is markedly different from that of
the Act: it is more general and open-ended. ' 219 He is confident that the
"amount of evidence that supports an open-ended reading of the amend-
ment" runs counter to "Berger's claims that the fourteenth amendment dealt
solely with the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act. ' ' 22  His "evidence"-
Stevens' "push[ing of] the equality principle to its limits"; 2 ' Howard's
"puzzlement" as to the meaning of "privileges or immunities"; 222 and
Poland's "all such partial state legislation" -has been examined earlier
and found wanting.224
Act and amendment proceeded on parallel tracks in the same session of
the same Congress so that the framers were quite familiar with the objectives
of each. The amendment was designed, as Dimond acknowledges, "to consti-
tutionalize the 1866 Act, both to prevent its repeal by a hostile future
Congress and to resolve any doubts concerning Congress's power to pass the
1866 Act under the thirteenth amendment."2' This does not weigh heavily
with him, however, because "the framers consciously used broad language
that is not a mere substitute for the 1866 Act.", 2 6 Notwithstanding, the fram-
ers, without dissent, considered the two as identical. As Charles Fairman
observed, "Over and over in this debate, the correspondence between Sec-
tion I of the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act is noted. The provisions of
219. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477.
220. Id. at 495.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 497.
223. Id. at 500 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2961) (emphasis added by Dimond).
224. Another bit of Dimond's "evidence": James Garfield said the amendment would "hold over every
American... the protecting shield of law," Dimond, supra note 3, at 4% (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at
2462), a "broad definition of equal protection." Dimond, supra note 3, at 496. In 1871 Garfield, who emphasized
that he "not only heard the whole debate at the time, but I have lately read over, with scrupulous care, every
word of it as recorded in the Globe," said,
In the long debate which followed this section [1] of the amendment was considered as equivalent to
the first section of the civil rights bill .... It was throughout the debate, with scarcely an exception,
spoken of as a limitation of the power of the States to legislate unequally for the protection of life and
property.
CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1871) (emphasis added). That, as we have seen, was Bingham's
own view.
"In particular," Dimond charges, "Berger omits discussion of the broad reading of the equal protection
clause invoked by Garfield .... " Dimond, supra note 3, at 480 n.94. The nub of Dimond's quotation is "It is a
broad and comprehensive limitation on the power of the State governments .... ." Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 153 (1871)). But Dimond, ever preferring the general to the specific, ignores
Garfield's above quoted summary: § 1 forbade states "to legislate unequally for the protection of life and
property."
Dimond chides me for not addressing Bingham's view of his "historical dispute" with Garfield, Dimond,
supra note 3, at 480 n.94; in 1871 Bingham sought to put a broader meaning on the amendment than he did in
1866. Garfield justly remarked that Bingham "can make but he cannot unmake history." CONG. GLOBE APP.,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1871). For those who prefer a lawyer to a rhetorician I commend Garfield's careful
analysis of the 1866 debate, copiously larded with extracts.
225. Dimond, supra note 3, at 477.
226. Id.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the one are treated as though they were essentially identical with those of the
other." 227 George B. Latham of West Virginia, speaking after Howard, ex-
pressed his "puzzlement" and stated that "the 'civil rights bill' which is now
a law ... covers exactly the same ground as this amendment. "' 2 s Henry
Raymond of New York referred to the Civil Rights Bill "by which Congress
proposed to exercise precisely the powers which that [the Bingham] amend-
ment was intended to confer." 229 Thayer considered "[I]t is but incorporating
in the Constitution... the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately
become a law" in order that it "shall be forever incorporated in the Constitu-
tion." 230 Harry Flack, a devotee of a broad construction of the fourteenth
amendment, states, "[N]early all said that it was but an incorporation of the
Civil Rights Bill .... [T]here was no controversy or misunderstanding as to
its purpose and meaning. ' ' 31 Dimond notes that Bingham himself said that
"the terms of the proposed Civil Rights Bill 'should be the law of every
State' . . . . Because it was not, Bingham would remedy that lack "'by
amending the constitution ... expressly prohibiting the States from any such
abuse of power in the future.' ,233 It is passing strange that Dimond prefers
the "generality" of the language to these unequivocal utterances. Justice
Bradley, a contemporary of the amendment, held, on the other hand, that
"the first section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amend-
ment."
234
Having been assured, for example, that the Act left segregated schools
untouched, a seismic shift by the framers to a ban on segregation in the
amendment, given pervasive and persisting racism, requires some explana-
tion. None is offered by Dimond. The more "general" terms can be and were
explained by Bickel: The "specific and exclusive enumeration of rights" in
the Act presumably was considered "inappropriate in a constitutional provi-
sion," 235 particularly because the "general" terms had consistently been as-
sociated with the narrow objectives of the Act, the protection of life, liberty,
and property. And he informed Frankfurter, "It was doubtful that an explicit
'no discrimination' provision going beyond the enumerated rights in the Civil
Rights Bill as finally enacted could have passed the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress .... , It was more than doubtful, for the framers repeatedly rejected
proposals to ban all discrimination. 237 "One is driven by the evidence,"
227. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understand-
ing, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 44 (1949).
228. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2883 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 2502 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 2465 (emphasis added).
231. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908).
232. Dimond, supra note 3, at 490 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at 1291).
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
235. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1955).
236. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654-55 (1976).
237. For citations see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 163-64. Compare such rejections with Dimond's
citation of Howard on the equal protection clause: It "abolishes all class legislation in the States .... Dimond,
supra note 3, at 499 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 32, at 2766). See statements of Stevens and Fessenden, infra
text accompanying notes 255 and 256.
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C. Vann Woodward wrote, "to the conclusion.., that popular convictions
were not prepared to sustain" a "guarantee of equality."" 3
The significance of another fact escapes Dimond: he observes that the
1870 Act "re-enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment. ' 239 If the amendment had the breadth he assigns to it, why did
not the Reconstruction Congress now go beyond the narrow confines of the
Act? The answer, I submit, is that the amendment was not designed to go
beyond assuring the constitutionality of the Act and safeguarding it from
repeal.
VI. THE OPEN-ENDED THEORY
Echoing Bickel's "open-ended" theory, Dimond insists that "[i]t proves
nothing to say that the framers had no present intent to outlaw school segrega-
tion by specific statute; the question is whether they could have intended that
future Congresses or the Court be free to do so under the authority of the
more general fourteenth amendment." 240 We have seen that an intention to
authorize invasion of state sovereignty over local concerns has to be stated
clearly. Bickel failed to fashion an escape hatch from this requirement. Initial-
ly he had informed Justice Frankfurter that "it is impossible to conclude that
the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to
conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were adopt-
ing.",24' Notwithstanding, Dimond maintains "Bickel argued that the con-
temporaneous debates show that Congress intended neither to outlaw dual
schooling in 1866 nor to prevent Congress or the Court from outlawing it in
the future .... 242 Of course one Congress cannot "prevent" another
Congress from acting; the question is whether the framers authorized a future
Congress "to outlaw dual schooling." Authority is not to be wrested from
silence or from ambiguous terms when they serve to encroach on matters
reserved to the states. It can be stated categorically that there is not an iota of
evidence in the debates for the proposition that the framers employed two-
faced language.
238. C. V. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 83 (1960); see also W. BROCK, AN
AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 286 (1963), and supra notes 69 and 78. These facts
make no impression on Dimond. Instead he relies on the fact that "[ihe opponents of the fourteenth amendment
complained at length about the risk of expansive 'construction' of § I and its open-ended phrasing .... "
Dimond, supra note 3, at 477 n.78. He himself notes that "exaggerating the scope of pending legislation to make
it appear more unattractive is a classic opposition technique," but brushes that aside because "the proponents
did not dispute these broad interpretations .... Id. at 497. There was no need to dispute because the
proponents repeatedly had underscored the scope of their endeavors. "An unsuccessful minority cannot put
words into the mouths of the majority .... - Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956). At
one point, Senator Trumbull explained that he did not reply to opposition assertions "because I thought we
should soonest get action on the bill by voting silently upon them." GLOBE, supra note 32, at 399. Dimond
could have profited by a study of my chapter on opposition statements. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 157-65.
239. Dimond, supra note 3, at 478.
240. Id. at 502; see also id. at 511 n.258.
241. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976) (emphasis added). In 1962 Bickel wrote that it was not the
framers' intention "to forbid the States to enact and enforce segregation statutes." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 100 (1962). It is a mark of Dimond's careless reading that he should have interpreted
Bickel's advice to Frankfurter as reflecting the "open-ended" theory. Dimond, supra note 3, at 511 n.258.
242. Dimond. suora note 3. at 463 (emphasis added).
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Bickel did not rely on the debates but on a tentative, speculative hypoth-
esis, retreating from his "impossible" under the influence of Frankfurter's
drive for a desegregation decision. Seeking to answer the question why "what
was equal in 1868 is not equal now," Frankfurter asserted that constitutional
terms must accommodate "changes in men's feelings, ' 24 so that equal pro-
tection could mean one thing in 1868 and the very opposite in 1954. Such a
theory of interpretation, one may surmise, did not sit well with Bickel, who
attempted to frame another, asking "what if any thought was given to the
long-range effect"244 of the amendment in the future? And he ventured the
hypothesis: could resort to equal protection of the laws "have failed to leave
the implication that the new phrase, while it did not necessarily, and certainly
not expressly, carry greater coverage than the old, was nevertheless roomier,
more receptive to 'latitudinarian' construction? No one made the point with
regard to this particular clause [nor the other clauses].- 2 45 "It remains true,"
he wrote, "that an explicit provision going further than the Civil Rights Act
could not have been carried in the 39th Congress . .,246 And he notes that
the Republicans drew back from a "formulation dangerously vulnerable to
attacks pandering to the prejudices of the people, 247 a prejudice the drafts-
men shared. But, he speculated, "[M]ay it not be that the Moderates and the
Radicals reached a compromise permitting them to go to the country with
language which they could, where necessary, defend against damaging alarms
raised by the opposition, but which at the same time was sufficiently elastic to
permit reasonable future advances?"2 48 This is mere speculation, not "ev-
idence." There was no need for "compromise." Senator John Sherman told
an Ohio audience in 1866, while the amendment was up for ratification, "[W]e
defeated every radical proposition ....249 M.L. Benedict concluded that
"[tihe nonradicals had enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence of
some radicals and over the opposition of many."'2'0 Bickel hypothesizes that
the "compromisers" concealed the future objectives they dared not avow lest
the whole enterprise collapse. There is not a shred of evidence, let me repeat,
that the framers employed double talk to hoodwink the ratifiers. If they did
there was no ratification, because it requires "a full knowledge of all the
material facts. If the material facts be either suppressed or unknown, the
ratification is treated as invalid ... ."2 It remains to be said that activist
243. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 685 (1976). "Men's feelings" had not changed, for it is generally
acknowledged that a desegregation amendment was unprocurable in 1954.
244. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (1955).
245. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 62.
248. Id. at 61. "Most congressional Republicans were aware of (and shared) their constituents' hostility to
black suffrage." M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 67 (1977). For statements of Senator Sherman, see sapra
note 96.
249. J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 167 (1956).
250. M.L. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 210 (1975). The radical opposition to readmission
of Tennessee because its Constitution excluded Negro suffrage was voted down 125 to 12 in the House and 34 to
4 in the Senate. GLOBE, sapra note 32, at 3980, 4000.
251. Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 629 (1835) (per Justice Story).
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Michael Perry considers that Berger "devastated the notion that the framers
of the fourteenth amendment... intended it to be 'open-ended.',22 Re-
liance on this theory overlooks that Bickel himself later tacitly repudiated his
earlier hypothesis. Testifying in 1968 before a Senate committee, he perceived
that the question before the framers was "whether they expected Congress to
have sort of an open-ended mandate, or whether they thought ... section
one particularly limited, imposed limits on what Congress could do, and there
the history to me shows a clear choice." They "voted down" Bingham's
original proposition which "left Congress too free," free to "go in there in
11253those States and simply rearrange the social scene ....
Dimond does not comment on the fact that the 39th Congress repeatedly
rejected proposals to bar ALL discrimination. s Nor does he notice
Stevens'-who had proposed such a bar at the outset-summation of his
views on the amendment: He had hoped that the people "would have so
remodeled all our institutions as to have freed them from every vestige
of... inequality of rights... that no distinction would be
tolerated .... This bright dream has vanished .... [W]e shall be obliged to
be content with patching up the worst portions of the ancient edifice." 255 The
reason, said Senator Fessenden, the influential chairman of the Joint Commit-
tee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, was, "[W]e cannot put into the Constitu-
tion, owing to existing prejudices and existing institutions, an entire exclusion
of all class distinctions .... In a statement strikingly applicable to the
relation between the long-debated narrow compass of the Civil Rights Act and
the "vague," "general" terms of the amendment, Madison wrote, "[I]t ex-
ceeds the possibility of belief, that the known advocates in the Convention for
a jealous grant & cautious definition of federal powers, should have silently
permitted the introduction of words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless
the restrictions & definitions elaborated by them. ' ' 2 7 Men do not use words
to defeat their purposes: "[W]e cannot rightly prefer ... [a meaning] which
will defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose. ' ' 218 Dimond ig-
nores these facts, proving once more that an artist [read activist] is known by
what he omits.
Alone among activists, John Ely, who translated the "open-ended"
terms as an "across-the-board invitation to import" extra-constitutional ele-
ments into the "constitutional decision process,' '9 shrank back from the
252. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 695 (1978).
253. Hearings on the Supreme Court Before the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (June 11, 1968).
254. For citations see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 163-464.
255. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 3148.
256. Id. at 705.
257. 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (1911).
258. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). Dimond takes refuge in the Solicitor General's
amicus brief in Brown, which asserted that the framers left the issue of segregation "open for decision by the
Court under the equal protection clause." Dimond, supra note 3, at 511 n.258. But as Sidney Hook wrote,
"[Wihat makes a thing true is not who says it, but the evidence for it ...... S. HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 121 (1980).
259. Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277, 277 (1979).
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genie he had conjured, finding it "frightening," "scary. ' ' 260 He therefore
proposed the formulation of principles whereby to limit the untethered discre-
tion. 26' That leaves the limits in the discretion of the Court and is no better
than the "self-restraint" that has so dismally failed. Under a Constitution that
limits all power, it cannot be that the Court alone enjoys illimitable power. 262
VII. CONCLUSION
Dimond's obtention of subsidies to refute my historical data, picking up
the gauntlet to cite "chapter and verse ' 263 five years after my publication,
suggests that prior efforts by his fellow crusaders, Soifer, Curtis & Co., failed
to accomplish their mission. Like them, Dimond opposes fantasy to fact,
generalities to limiting specifics, 264 and is given to inaccuracies and misstate-
ments, which the foregoing account by no means exhausts. Let Justice
Jackson draw the moral. In his guide to advocacy before the Supreme Court
he cautioned the neophyte: "[I]f the first decision does not support [the
proposition], I conclude the lawyer has a blunderbuss mind and rely on him
no further." 
21
It is said that Thomas Hardy often answered harsh reviews "in an at-
tempt to educate the critical fraternity, which seemed determined almost to a
man to resist innovation. ' ' 26 There are quarters where the winds of change do
not ruffle a hair, 267 but the rising tide of activists who acknowledge that the
fourteenth amendment did not limit the rights of the states to control suffrage
and segregation, and did not incorporate the Bill of Rights, testifies that my
own educational efforts have not been in vain. Even so bitter a critic as Paul
Brest, who in 1977 aligned me with "racists" because I questioned the sanc-
tity of Brown v. Board of Education,268 recently noted that advocates of
"fundamental rights" not "specified by the text or original history of the
Constitution" argue that "the judiciary is nonetheless authorized" (where?)
to protect those "rights which can be discovered in conventional morality or
260. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34 (1980); Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 425 (1978).
261. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 448 (1978).
262. For citations see R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE
77-79 (1982).
263. Dimond, supra note 3, at 463 n.8.
264. Ely observes that "by favoring ... the 'general over the particular"' one can support any conceiv-
able position. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 67 (1980).
265. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations, 37
A.B.A. J. 801, 804 (1951).
266. Broyard, Books of the Times, New York Times, May 12, 1982, Book Review, at C-29, col. 3. Writing
of current criticism of Einstein's theory of special relativity, philosopher Michael Polyani notes that the believ-
ers "had so well closed their minds to any suggestion which threatened the new rationality achieved by
Einstein's world-picture, that it was almost impossible for them to think again in different terms. Little attention
was paid to the [current] experiments, the evidence being set aside in the hope that it would one day tar out to
be wrong." Wade, Shoot-out With Einstein in Arizona, New York Times, April 19, 1982, The Editorial Note-
book, at A-20, col. 1, 3.
267. Referring to the French Army's lamentable Operations Bureau in World War I, Barbara Tuchman
observed, "They formed what a French military critic called 'a church outside which there was no salvation and
which could never pardon those who revealed the falsity of its doctrine."' B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF
AUGUST 416-17 (1962).
268. Brest, Berger v. Brown et al., New York Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 10.
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derived through the methods of philosophy and adjudication." 269 This merely
seeks to rationalize what Chief Justice Warren did in fact. A worshipful ad-
mirer and former clerk of Warren, G. Edward White, said that Warren "was
never concerned with constitutional text or intention. Rather, he believed that
his job as judge lay in discovering and articulating the 'ethical imperatives' he
felt were (or should be) embedded in the Constitution." 270 Not what the
Constitution required but what Warren "felt" it "should" require was his test
of constitutionality-a palpable arrogation of power to revise the Constitution
that article V confided to the people alone.
Little wonder that Brest challenged the assumption "that judges...
were bound by the text or original understanding of the Constitution." 27' That
judges are sworn "to support the Constitution" is of no consequence. But
when Brest came to examine the theories of "seven representative scholars
who favor one or another form of fundamental rights adjudication," 272 he
concluded that they were largely in disagreement and that "their conclusions
are not obviously determined by their sources and methods," 273 implying that
they are derived from their own predilections, as is confirmed by his adjura-
tion to academe "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings [about
judicial review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus
briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions
of the public good." 274 This is more than a confession of intellectual bank-
ruptcy; it acknowledges that for a generation academe has diverted constitu-
tional analysis from its constitutional channels in order to cram its moral and
social norms down the throat of an unwilling public, e.g., busing, pornog-
raphy, death penalties, and the like.
In time to come, I predict, this will be regarded as an arrant disservice to
democratic self-government, a sorry chapter in legal scholarship. Comment-
ing on a collateral issue-'"the incontrovertible conclusion that the [four-
teenth] amendment was never intended to confer upon the recently enfran-
chised slaves the whole complex of social and political rights that would have
made them equal to the white citizens, but only the restricted rights in relation
to life, limb and property and access to the courts that have been spelled out
in the Civil Rights Act"-Sir Max Beloff, an eminent Oxford emeritus, stated,
"The quite extraordinary contortions that have gone into proving the contrary
make sad reading for those impressed by the high quality of American legal-
historical scholarship." 275 Dimond, Soifer & Co. might take that to heart.
269. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1981) (emphasis added).
270. McDowell, Earl Warren's Good Intentions Weren't Enough, (book review of G.E. WHITE, EARL
WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982)), Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 20, col. 3 (emphasis added).
271. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 224 (1980).
272. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067, 1089 (1981).
273. Id. at 1089.
274. Id. at 1109.
275. Beloff, Arbiters of America's Destiny, The London Times, April 7, 1978, (Higher Education Supple-
ment), at II.
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